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STATE OF NEW Y O K  
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ALBANY 
In The Matter of CRAIG SCHRUTT, 
-against- 
NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE 
AND COMMUNITY SUPERVISION, 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
Petitioner, 
Res? ondent, 
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI # 01-12-ST3489 Index No. 126-12 
Appearances: Craig Schrutt 
Inmate No. 10-B- 14 19 
Petitioner, Pro Se 
Watertown Correctional Facility 
P.O. Box 168 
Watertown, NY 1360 1 
Eric T. Schneidennan 
Attorney General 
State of New York 
Attorney For Respondent 
The Capitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
(Brian J. O'Donnell, 
Assistant Attorney General 
of Counsel) 
George B, Ceresia, Jr., Justice 
The petitioner, an inmate at Watertown Correctional Facility, commenced the instant 
CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a detemination of respondent dated March I6,20 I. 1 
to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. The petitioner is serving an aggregate tern 
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of two to six years upon convictions of grand Iarceny-not auto 4th degree, 2 counts of grand 
larceny-auto 3d degree, 2 counts of criminal possession of a forged instrument 2nd, scheme 
to defiaud 1st degree, grand larceny-not auto 2nd degree, and reckless endangerment. 
Among the arguments set forth in the petition, the petitioner alleges that the Parole Board’s 
determination was based upon speculation that the petitioner might re-offend. He maintains 
that no credit was given for his positive programming and clean disciplinary record. In his 
view the crimes for which he is incarcerated are relatively minor when compared to the 
crimes of other inmates who have been released on parole; and do not demonstrate a pattern 
of lawlessness. He maintains that his criminal history prior to his current offenses is limited, 
invoIving a misdemeanor for disorderly conduct. He asserts that the Parole Board was biased 
against him. He contends that the Parole Board failed to consider the appropriate factors 
under Executive Law 5 25 94, including an exemplary institutional record, excellent 
institutional adjustment and academic achievements. He maintains that the Parole Board 
based it’s decision upon the seriousness of the crimes for which he is incarcerated, to the 
exdusion of alf other factors. 
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole 
are set forth as follows: 
“Denied 24 months. Next appearance 3/13. 
“Despite your receiving an earned eligibility certificate, parole 
is denied. After a careful review of your record, your personal 
interview, and due deliberation, it is the determination of this 
Panel that, if released at this time, there is a reasonable 
probability that you would not live at liberty without violating 
the law, and your release at this time is incompatible with the 
welfare and safety of the community. This decision is based 
upon the following factors. 
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“You appear before this Panel with the serious instant offense 
of grand larceny auto third two counts, criminal possession of a 
forged instrument second, two counts, scheme to defraud first, 
grand larceny not auto second, two counts, scheme to defraud 
first, grand larceny not auto second, grand larceny not auto 
fourth, and reckless endangerment second. You collected sales 
tax from automobile sales and failed to submit the taxes to New 
York State. You purchased automobiles using checks with 
insufficient funds in the account. You fraudulently opened a 
credit card and used it for purchases. You submitted fraudulent 
lien releases for automobiles. You recklessly poured diesel fuel 
on the engine of a female victim’s car. Rather than a single 
event, these exhibit lawless over extended period of time. Your 
record also includes issuing bad checks. Consideration has been 
given to your receipt of an earned eligibility certificate, any 
program completion, and any safety behavior, however your 
release at this time is denied.” 
Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory 
requirements, not reviewable  10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept,, 
20041; Matter of Collado v New York State Division of Parole, 287 AD2d 921 [3d Dept., 
200 I]). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety” on the part 
of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention (see Matter of Silrnon 
v Travis, 95 NY2d 370, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801; see also Matter of Grazimo v Evans, 90 AD3d 1367,1369 
[3d Dept., 201 11). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the 
discretionary determination made by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v. New York 
State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 2004). 
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its 
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the 
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offenses, attention was paid to such 
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factors as petitioner’s institutional programming, his clean disciplinary record, and his pIms 
upon release, involving living with his fianck in North Tonawanda, and a full time job with 
a dry cleaning service. The Board also took note of a number of letters submitted on his 
behalf. In addition, he was given ample opportunity to make comments in support of his 
release. 
The decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the 
denial of parole and it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law $2594 (see Matter of 
Siao-Pao, 11 NY3d 773 [2008]; Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 
19941; Matter of Green v. New York State Division of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 
1993 1). It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of 
the inmate‘s crimes and their violent nature (see Matter of Matos v New York State Board 
ofparole, 87 AD3d 1193 [3d Dept., 201 I]; Matter ofDudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd 
Dept., 1996). The Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each 
factor that it considered in determining the inmate’s application, or to expressly discuss each 
one (see Matter of MacKenzie v Evans, supra; Matter of Matos v New York State Board of 
Parole, supra; Matter of Young v New York Division of ParoIe, 74 AD3d 1682, 1681-1682 
[3rd Dept., 20101; Matter of Wise v New York State Division of Parole, 54 AD3d 463 [3d 
Dept., 20081). Nor must the par& board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the 
first sentence of Executive Law 8 259-i (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of Sihero v Rennison, 28 
AD3d 859 [3rd Dept., 20061). In other words, “[wlhere appropriate the Board may give 
considerable weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for 
which a petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the 
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other statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare 
of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to 
undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter of Durio v New York State Division of Parole, 3 
AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A], other citations 
omitted). 
It is we11 settled that receipt of a certificate of earned eligibility does not serve as a 
guarantee ofrelease (Matter ofDorman v New York State Board ofParofe, 30 AD3d 880 [3d 
Dept., 20061; Matter of Pearl v New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1058 [3rd 
Dept., 20061). 
In addition, the Parole Board’s decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24 
months) is within the Board‘s discretion and was supported by the record (see Matter of Tatta 
v State of New York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, IV denied 98 
NY2d 604). 
The Court has reviewed petitioner’s remaining arguments and contentions and finds 
them to be without merit. 
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of 
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The 
petition must therefore be dismissed. 
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the 
petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order, 
is sealing all records submitted for in cameru review. 
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Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed. 
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original 
decisionlorderljudgment is returned to the attorney €or the respondents. All other papers are 
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing. The signing of this 
decisionlorderljudgment and delivery of this decisiodorderljudpent does not constitute 
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable 
provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry. 
/ 
ENTER 
George B. Ceresia, Jr. 
Supreme Court Justice 
Dated: August 1>,2012 




3 .  
Order To Show Cause dated February 24,2012, Petition, Supporting Papers 
and Exhibits 
Respondent’s Answer dated April 26,20 12, Supporting Papers and Exhibits 
Petitioner’s Reply To Answer filed May 9,2012 
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